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Civil Procedure.  Polanco v. Lombardi, 231 A.3d 139 (R.I. 2020).  
The discovery rule is only available in certain categories of 
negligence claims and does not extend more broadly to general 
negligence claims.  A plaintiff injured as a result of a police officer’s 
failure to produce a police report—particularly one that may have 
contained information exculpating the plaintiff in a subsequent 
criminal case—first sustains its injury when that plaintiff is 
arraigned.  Heck v. Humphrey and the exoneration rule do not 
extend to state law negligence claims.  Under section 9-1-20 of the 
Rhode Island General Laws, failure to produce a police report is not 
an affirmative misrepresentation capable of tolling the applicable 
statute of limitations.  Equitable tolling is not appropriate where a 
plaintiff could have discovered their injury by exercising reasonably 
diligent efforts or in the absence of extraordinary circumstances 
that prevented the plaintiff from discovering their injury within the 
statutory period. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On August 13, 2005, Fernando Fernandez was assaulted with 
a pool cue at the Mi Sueño club in Providence, Rhode Island.1  
Officer Michael Camardo of the Providence Police Department 
responded to the incident, but after conducting an initial 
investigation at the scene, he determined that the assault 
complaint was unfounded and did not file a police report of the 
incident.2  Importantly, Officer Camardo took this course of action 
notwithstanding the statements of two alleged witnesses—Luz 
Morales and Lexsandro Collazo—both of whom Dionisio Polanco 
(the principal plaintiff) said were interviewed by Officer Camardo 
at the time of the incident.3  
Separately, the Providence Police Department responded to a 
call from Mr. Fernandez’s family and friends from the hospital 
1. Polanco v. Lombardi, 231 A.3d 139, 142 (R.I. 2020).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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where Mr. Fernandez was receiving treatment for his injuries.4  
There, the owner of Mi Sueño, Jesus Titin, identified Mr. Polanco 
as the assailant.5  It was not until two years later, in 2007, that Mr. 
Polanco was arrested for the felony assault of Mr. Fernandez.6 
At Mr. Polanco’s 2008 bench trial, Mr. Titin testified—contrary 
to his prior statement—that Mr. Polanco was not the individual 
who struck Mr. Fernandez.7  Notably, Mr. Titin also testified that 
Officer Camardo “messed up” when he failed to file a police report 
of the incident.8  However, a Mi Sueño  employee, who worked on 
the night of the 2005 assault, testified that Mr. Polanco was indeed 
the true assailant.9  On July 30, 2008, the court found Mr. Polanco 
guilty.10  He was later sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment, with 
four years to serve and the remainder of the sentence suspended.11 
Two years later, during the Summer of 2010, Ms. Morales—one 
of the witnesses of the 2005 assault—returned to Rhode Island from 
Puerto Rico and learned of Mr. Polanco’s conviction.12  Shortly 
thereafter, Ms. Morales and Mr. Collazo—the other witness who 
spoke with Officer Camardo at the scene of the assault—executed 
affidavits stating that they had witnessed the assault, that Mr. 
Polanco was not the true assailant, and that they had both provided 
statements—including a physical description of the assailant—to a 
police officer at the scene.13  In light of these affidavits, Mr. Polanco 
filed a motion for—and was subsequently granted—a new trial in 
September 2010.14  Although Mr. Polanco was released from 
detention, he was remanded to the custody of United States 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).15  The State of 








11. Id. at 142–43.
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stemming from the 2005 assault, and he was released from ICE 
custody.16 
Mr. Polanco and the other plaintiff in the suit (his wife) filed 
the complaint that gave rise to the instant case in April 2012.17  The 
plaintiffs alleged one count of negligence against Officer Camardo 
based upon his failure to file a police report of the 2005 assault of 
Mr. Fernandez—a report which plaintiffs believed would have 
included the eyewitness statements of Ms. Morales and Mr. 
Collazo.18  At bottom, plaintiffs claimed that Officer Camardo’s 
failure to file a police report resulted in the nondisclosure of 
potentially exculpatory information that Mr. Polanco could have 
used to develop a better defense in his criminal case.19  The 
plaintiffs also alleged a single negligence count against the City of 
Providence under a theory of respondeat superior.20  The plaintiffs 
alleged damages, included compensation for Mr. Polanco’s thirty-
two month incarceration, his remand to ICE custody for 
deportation, his loss of earning capacity, his extreme pain and 
suffering, and the deprivation of the society and companionship of 
his wife and children.21 
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing 
that the plaintiffs’ suit was barred by the applicable three-year 
statute of limitations.22  In response, the plaintiffs argued that the 
discovery rule should be applied in the case to delay the time at 
which the statutory clock would begin running to the time when 
Ms. Morales and Mr. Collazo executed their affidavits in August of 
2010, as Mr. Polanco’s discovery of their identities prior to August 
2010 would have been impossible.23  As a failsafe, the plaintiffs also 
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given the circumstances of Mr. Polanco’s case.24  The defendants’ 
motion was heard in February 2018.25 
The hearing justice granted the motion for summary judgment, 
finding that the applicable statute of limitations began to run on 
July 30, 2008—when Mr. Polanco began to serve his sentence for 
the assault conviction—as Mr. Polanco “knew he had suffered an 
injury when he was denied his liberty.”26  As this date preceded the 
plaintiffs’ April 2012 suit by more than three years, the plaintiffs’ 
suit was time barred.27  Next, the hearing justice determined that 
tolling of the statute of limitations pursuant to section 9-1-20 of the 
Rhode Island General Laws was unavailable to the plaintiffs, as 
Officer Camardo’s alleged negligent failure to submit a police report 
did not amount to the type of affirmative misrepresentation of 
material fact required for tolling to apply under section 9-1-20.28  
Lastly, the hearing justice concluded that the discovery rule applies 
only in limited categories of cases, and that the general negligence 
case against the defendants “d[id] not fall into any of those 
categories.”29  The court entered final judgment in favor of the 
defendants on all counts in April of 2018, and the plaintiffs timely 
appealed.30 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court began de novo review of the 
grant of summary judgment by determining the threshold issue of 
when exactly Mr. Polanco incurred his injury.31  In a slight 
departure from the court below, the Court held that Mr. Polanco 
incurred his injury not when he began to serve his sentence in 2008, 
but instead when he was initially arraigned and bound over for trial 
for the assault charge in October 5, 2007.32  Importantly, this 
determination resulted in the statutory clock beginning to run even 
24. Id.
25. Id.






32. Id. at 145.
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earlier, thus placing the plaintiffs’ 2012 claims even further outside 
the statute of limitations in the absence of some applicable law that 
might stop that clock from running.33 
The plaintiffs brought four different legal arguments for tolling 
the applicable statute of limitations.  The plaintiffs first argued that 
the statute should be tolled by the discovery rule, which, when 
available, prevents the statutory clock from beginning “to run until 
the plaintiff discovers, or with reasonable diligence should have 
discovered, the wrongful conduct.”34  However, according to the 
Court, the plaintiffs’ general negligence claim did not fall within 
any of the limited categories of claims eligible for the discovery 
rule.35  Importantly, the Court noted that even if the discovery rule 
did apply, it would not have saved the plaintiffs’ case here because 
the latest point at which the plaintiffs could have reasonably 
discovered their injuries was at the time of Mr. Polanco’s conviction 
in 2008—a point that would still fall outside the applicable statute 
of limitations.36  The Court also highlighted the fact that Officer 
Camardo’s failure to submit a police report was revealed at Mr. 
Polanco’s trial, and posited that such a revelation “should have put 
plaintiffs on notice that a further investigation as to what may have 
been in that report was required.”37  Further, the Court noted that 
the party seeking to apply the discovery rule has the burden to show 
they exercised reasonable diligence to discover the injury, and the 
plaintiffs here failed to meet that burden.38 
Next, the plaintiffs argued that the exoneration rule laid out in 
the United States Supreme Court Case Heck v. Humphrey39 
prevented Mr. Polanco from bringing forth his claim from his 2008 
conviction through when his conviction was vacated in 2010, 
thereby tolling the applicable statute of limitations until 2010 and 
making their collective claims timely.40  In response, the 
33. Id.
34. Id. at 146 (quoting Mills v. Toselli, 819 A.2d 202, 205 (R.I. 2003)).
35. Id. at 147.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 147–48.
38. Id. at 148.
39. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
40. Polanco, 231 A.3d at 149–50.  The plaintiffs specifically claimed that
“Mr. Polanco needed to obtain post-conviction relief before suing because his 
civil action attacked his conviction.”  Id. at 149. 
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defendants argued that the exoneration rule applies only where a 
plaintiff’s underlying claims challenge the validity of their criminal 
conviction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that the plaintiffs here 
brought no such claim in their complaint.41  Here, the Court agreed 
with the defendants, and refused to extend the holding in Heck to 
state law negligence claims.42  As such, the Court held that Heck 
and the exoneration rule did not apply to delay the accrual of the 
plaintiffs’ injuries to a date within the applicable statute of 
limitations.43 
Third, the plaintiffs argued that Officer Camardo’s failure to 
compile and submit a police report amounted to fraudulent 
concealment under section 9-1-20 of the Rhode Island General Laws 
and that the statute of limitations should have been tolled 
accordingly until the plaintiffs discovered Officer Camardo’s 
concealment.44  In support of this argument, the plaintiffs relied on 
a statement that the detective assigned to the 2005 assault case 
made during a deposition, which seemed to suggest that Officer 
Camardo falsely told the detective that nobody reported an assault 
to him on the night in question.45  However, the Court held that the 
failure to file a police report amounted to “mere silence or inaction 
on the part of the defendant” and that such a failure does not 
qualify as an actual misrepresentation for the purposes of section 
9-1-20.46  In addition, in reviewing the deposition transcripts, the
Court held that the detective’s testimony surrounding his
conversation with Officer Camardo “simply [did] not rise to the level
of an actual misrepresentation.”47  Thus, the Court concluded that
41. Id. at 150.  The Heck rule specifically states that, “in order to recover
damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for 
other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction 
or sentence invalid . . . a §1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sen-
tence has been [exonerated].”  See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87. 
42. Polanco, 231 A.3d at 152.
43. Id. at 153.
44. Id.
45. Id. (quoting Boudreau v. Automatic Temperature Controls, Inc., 212
A.3d 594, 601–02 (R.I. 2019)).
46. Id. at 153–54 (quoting Boudreau, 212 A.3d at 601–02).
47. Id. at 154–55.
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section 9-1-20 did not apply to toll the applicable statute of 
limitations.48 
Lastly, the plaintiffs argued that the “unusual” nature of Mr. 
Polanco’s conviction and resulting claims presented a case ripe for 
equitable tolling of the statute of limitations to 2010, the point at 
which the new witnesses came forward.49  In response, the 
defendants argued that the statute of limitations should not be 
equitably tolled in this case, as the plaintiffs failed to undertake 
any reasonably diligent efforts to investigate their claims between 
Mr. Polanco’s conviction and the time at which the new witnesses 
came forward, noting that Mr. Polanco became aware of Officer 
Camardo’s failure to submit a police report at his trial in 2008.50  
Once again, the Court agreed with the defendants, noting that a 
clear prerequisite to the equitable tolling of the statute of 
limitations is “either a plaintiff who was not able to discover his or 
her injury despite diligent efforts or extraordinary circumstances 
that prevented a plaintiff from complying with the deadline despite 
using reasonable diligence.”51  Noting that the plaintiffs failed to 
interview Officer Camardo “prior to or during the trial,” the Court 
found that the plaintiffs did not exercise reasonably diligent efforts 
to investigate their claims, rendering equitable tolling unavailable 
in their case.52 
At bottom, the plaintiffs’ claims accrued at the time of Mr. 
Polanco’s arraignment on October 5, 2007, and “were not tolled by 
the discovery rule, the holding in Heck, the exoneration rule, 
§ 9-1-20, or the doctrine of equitable tolling.”53  As a result, the
plaintiffs’ 2012 suit was filed after the three-year statute of
limitations expired and was therefore time barred.54
48. Id. at 155.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 155–56.
52. Id. at 156.
53. Id.
54. Id.  However, the Court’s opinion in this case was not unanimous.  In
a thoughtful dissent, Justice Flaherty found Mr. Polanco’s case to be “extraor-
dinary,” and argued that equitable tolling should have applied to bring Mr. 
Polanco’s claim within the applicable statute of limitations “[i]f equity is to 
mean anything at all.”  See id. at 159 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).  To Justice 
Flaherty, the majority’s suggestion that Mr. Polanco would be capable of exer-
cising reasonable diligence in the investigation of his claim—while behind bars 
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COMMENTARY 
Despite the difficulty of the instant case, and the disappointing 
result for the plaintiffs, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held fast 
to its prior decisions that establish when statutes of limitations can 
appropriately be tolled in general negligence claims.  As a general 
rule, only certain categories of tort claims are eligible for tolling 
under the discovery rule, including medical malpractice claims, 
drug product liability claims, and actions involving improvements 
to real property.55  To extend the discovery rule’s applicability to all 
negligence claims thus represented a step too far to the Court. 
Moreover, even if the discovery rule were extended to the plaintiffs’ 
claims, the claims would still fall outside of the applicable statute 
of limitations.56  Interestingly, the Court also found that Mr. 
Polanco’s injuries accrued at his arraignment in October of 2007, 
the point at which “his incarceration and its attendant harms began 
to befall him” as a result of Officer Camardo’s alleged negligence.57  
Thus, whether he was first made aware of his injury at his 
arraignment or at his subsequent bench trial in 2008 was 
ultimately immaterial, as the plaintiffs’ filing of their suit in 2012 
placed either date, and the points between them, outside the statute 
of limitations. 
Further, the plaintiffs’ attempt to invoke Heck and the 
exoneration rule were somewhat of a stretch, as the plaintiffs’ 
claims surrounded the alleged negligence of Officer Camardo and 
did not challenge the legitimacy of Mr. Polanco’s conviction under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.58  Additionally, the failure to file a police report—
an unfortunate omission on Officer Camardo’s part—is not the type 
of affirmative misrepresentation required to allow section 9-1-20 of 
the Rhode Island General Laws to kick in and toll the applicable 
three-year statute of limitations.59  Here again, the latest point at 
which Mr. Polanco could have discovered Officer Camardo’s failure 
to submit a police report was arguably at his own trial in 2008.  
on the basis of faulty eyewitness testimony—was, “in and of itself, unreasona-
ble.”  See id. at 158–59. 
55. Id. at 146–47 (majority opinion).
56. Id. at 147.
57. Id. at 145.
58. Id. at 152.
59. Id. at 154.
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Thus, even if Officer Camardo’s omission was sufficient to trigger 
section 9-1-20, the plaintiffs’ claims would have likely still failed. 
However, when it comes to the equitable tolling argument, 
Justice Flaherty’s dissent should not fall on deaf ears.  Unlike the 
majority opinion, which quickly dismisses any suggestion that Mr. 
Polanco exercised reasonably diligent efforts to investigate the 
veracity of his claims, Justice Flaherty’s dissent reminds the Court 
that Mr. Polanco’s ability to exercise such efforts was considerably 
limited as a result of his incarceration.60  Justice Flaherty also calls 
attention to the fact that Mr. Polanco’s wrongful conviction 
stemmed from faulty eyewitness testimony and reiterates the 
original hearing justice’s opinion that neither Mr. Polanco nor his 
defense team could have discovered the existence of the two 
exculpatory witnesses until they came forward in 2010.61  To 
Justice Flaherty, Mr. Polanco’s knowledge that Officer Camardo 
failed to file a police report could not itself “lead to a conclusion that 
. . . unidentified witnesses [existed].”62  Therefore, in light of the 
totality of Mr. Polanco’s extraordinary circumstances, Justice 
Flaherty argued that equitable tolling of the applicable statute of 
limitations was appropriate in the instant case.63  His well-
reasoned argument is certainly noteworthy for future plaintiffs 
suffering similar injuries. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court declined to extend the 
discovery rule to general negligence claims and instead held fast to 
the limits it placed upon that doctrine in its earlier jurisprudence.  
The Court also held that neither Heck nor the exoneration rule 
apply to state law negligence claims and are limited in their 
application to claims challenging the legitimacy of criminal 
convictions brought forth pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Further, 
the Court held that the failure of a police officer to file a police 
report does not amount to the type of affirmative misrepresentation 
needed for section 9-1-20 of the Rhode Island General Laws to toll 
the applicable statute of limitations in a general negligence claim. 
60. See id. at 159 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
61. See id. at 157–59.
62. Id. at 159.
63. Id.
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Lastly, the Court reaffirmed that equitable tolling of applicable 
statutes of limitations is not available to plaintiffs who fail to 
exercise reasonable diligence to investigate the veracity of their 
claims or whose circumstances do not prevent the exercise of such 
efforts. 
 Edward A. Gencarelli, Jr. 
